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We Lack a Shared Understanding

insert-transcript#d95a44a7-62a7-4f19-93f2-60262e100754-here

What anchors our understanding, as researchers, of intentional action, knowledge, intention and the rest?

option 1 : the researcher’s personal expertise

objection - diversity

objection - lexical fallacy (Fiske, 2020)

insert-transcript#3863aa66-9db6-4c4f-857d-e718104d1872-here

As philosophers see
folk psychology ...

‘When someone is in so-and-so combination of mental states and receives sensory stimuli of so-and-so kind, he tends with so-and-so probability to be caused thereby to go into so-and-so mental states and produce so-and-so motor responses.’

(Lewis, 1972, p. 256)

(my|your|his|her|their) phone

is trying to (excluding ‘kill me’) [283,000]

eg ‘my phone is trying to navigate me to Alex even though he has been deleted’

wants to [278,000]

hates [147,000]

likes [86,800]

thinks (e.g. ‘My phone thinks I’m in another city’) [53,400]

is pretending [16,000]

insert-transcript#7f077764-ba24-49df-a611-84e18b1a75ae-here

Is

folk psychology

a source of common knowledge of principles

that implicitly define ‘intention’, ‘knowledge’, and the rest

?

Lewis (1972) vs Heider (1958)

insert-transcript#8ee1f6ae-598b-4c85-a85b-850ab9a59750-here

What anchors our understanding, as researchers, of intentional action, knowledge, intention and the rest?

option 1 : the researcher’s personal expertise

objection - diversity

objection - lexical fallacy (Fiske, 2020)

option 2 : philosophical accounts

obstacle - diversity

insert-transcript#d7b80361-3caf-498a-aebc-a6f47aa92c40-here
INTENTIONyesno
Is it a mental state?Davidson (1978)Thompson (2008)
Is it a belief?Velleman (1989)Bratman (1987)
Entails belief?Harman (1976)Levy (2018)
Linked to planning?(Bratman, 1985)
Incompatible with habitual? Kalis & Ometto (2021)
Entails non-observational knowledgeAnscombe (1957)
Comes in two kinds?Searle (1983)Brozzo (2021)
insert-transcript#bc568d61-bac3-4fea-a8a9-299877d73139-here
How about just picking a theory? Or perhaps even taking several and considering, for each, the hypothesis that this is how the folk understand knowledge.
Actually this is sometimes the right thing to do. But there are two obstacles.

Two obstacles

- many incompatible theories, each only slightly different from nearby alterantives

- differences hard to operationalize

insert-transcript#9a735a36-ed09-437a-af4e-e0d309563092-here

What anchors our understanding, as researchers, of intentional action, knowledge, intention and the rest?

option 1 : the researcher’s personal expertise

objection - diversity

objection - lexical fallacy (Fiske, 2020)

option 2 : philosophical accounts

obstacle - diversity

objection - n’ting good anchors philosophers’ understandings

Compare Nagel: ‘Unless there is a special reason to think that knowledge attributions work quite differently when we are reading philosophy papers - and I'll shortly survey some evidence against that sort of exceptionalism - we should expect to find that epistemic case intuitions are generated by the natural capacity responsible for our everyday attributions of states of knowledge, belief and desire. esire. This capacity has been given various labels, including 'folk psychology', 'mindreading', and 'theory of mind’’ (Nagel, 2012, p. 510).
insert-transcript#f7a57c0f-4a71-4300-8644-6f4afb0b5666-here

Philosophical Folk Psychology

‘epistemic case intuitions are generated by [...] folk psychology’

Nagel (2012, p. 510)

‘some part of us finds it almost impossible not to categorise them as’ agents

Steward (2009, p. 229)

insert-transcript#b0a815b7-1e13-40fc-ae22-c05848a2e79a-here

Philosophical accounts of minds and actions ...

... anchor a shared understanding of what knowledge, belief, joy and the rest are.

... could be (mis)used to characterise various models of mind.

Will in fact exploit this idea later.
insert-transcript#fbc7d7c0-5a92-4ca0-8713-2bb2b31021d9-here

What anchors our understanding, as researchers, of action, belief, knowledge and the rest?

option 1 : the researcher’s personal expertise

objection - diversity

objection - lexical fallacy (Fiske, 2020)

option 2 : philosophical accounts

obstacle - diversity

objection - n’ting good anchors philosophers’ understandings

option 3 : work back from operationalization

obstacle - which one? (Happé, Cook, & Bird, 2017; Beaudoin, Leblanc, Gagner, & Beauchamp, 2020)

objection - no single factor (Warnell & Redcay, 2019)