based on Reynolds & Bronstein (2003)
two kinds of state are inferentially integrated:
in the absence of
obstacles
such as time pressure, distraction,
motivations to be irrational, self-deception or
exhaustion,
any states of these kinds can jointly
feature in a single process
of inference or practical
reasoning
in such a way that
arbitrary rational relations between their contents
appropriately influence how the process unfolds.
two responses
it’s not a real problem
it’s real but your solution is wrong
interface problemS
primary motivational states vs desires
(Dickinson & Balleine, 1994)
precise number representations vs analog magnitudes
(Odic, Le Corre, & Halberda, 2015; Ebersbach & Erz, 2014)
ant navigation: path integration vs visual landmarks
(Buehlmann, Mangan, & Graham, 2020)
owls: auditory vs visual cues to location
(Knudsen, 2002)
...
interface problems with artifacts
flight controllers: radar vs flight strips
(Durso, Batsakes, Crutchfield, Braden, & Manning, 2004)
astronomy: radio vs optical measurements
(Fan, Budavári, Norris, & Basu, 2020)
music: sheet vs audio
(Dannenberg & Raphael, 2006)
...
Why are interface problems pervasive? Why not just inferentially integrate?
aside: representational format
the interface problem ‘is framed by [...] assumptions [including] that intentions are propositionally formatted, whereas motor representations are not
[...]
this understanding of the interface may need replacement. Arguably there are several interfaces within motor representation (and indeed, cognition)’
(Mylopoulos, Pacherie, & Shepherd, 2025, p. §7)
two responses
it’s not a real problem
it’s real but your solution is wrong
reference by deference
Mylopoulos & Pacherie (2016, p. §4)
simple objection
fixing reference demonstratively does not explain matching
observational vs executable action concept
(Pacherie, 2011, p. §3)
back to 2000 ...
‘basic action concepts are demonstrative concepts.
To have the concept of a basic action is to have a concept of acting ‘thus’,
where ‘thus’ denotes a property made accessible to the agent by the motor representations he is able to form.’
(Pacherie, 2000, p. 425)
case study
Humans can
intentionally produce words
years before they can
act on phone-structured intentions successfully.
ex: add [p] to [ˈɔzɐ]
(Morais, Cary, Alegria, & Bertelson, 1979)
Two Interface Problems
from ~10-16 months on
belief/intention: word
matches (or not)
motor representation: word- or syllable-sized plan for articulatory gestures
after phonological awareness (≥5 years*)
belief/intention: phone-structured action
matches (or not)
motor representation: phone-sized components of plan for articulatory gestures
background
adaptation at phoneme level
(peturbed auditory feedback for /e/)
-> have phone-structured motor representations
but
little or no phonological awareness
in 4-5 year old pre-schoolers
(Caudrelier et al., 2019)
‘in NW [non-words] trials, the experimenter uttered a non-word which would become another non-word, for instance "osa" became "posa", "chosa" or "mosa" depending on phone condition.’
(Morais et al., 1979, p. 326)
(A. M. Liberman, Cooper, Shankweiler, & Studdert-Kennedy, 1967, p. fig.~2)
articulatory getsure
example: closing the lips; constrict tongue tip
Goldstein & Fowler (2003, p. fig.~1)
lack of inferential integration
between motor representations and beliefs
most teachers cannot count the phones in ‘ox’
(Treiman & Cassar, 1997)
One interface problem or two?
interface problem
Two Interface Problems
from ~10-16 months on
belief/intention: word
matches (or not)
motor representation: word- or syllable-sized plan for articulatory gestures
after phonological awareness (≥5 years*)
belief/intention: phone-structured action
matches (or not)
motor representation: phone-sized components of plan for articulatory gestures
crude idea 1
merely linking motor representations to perceived phonetic contrasts is sufficient for matching
(Choi et al., 2019, p. fig.~1)
(Bruderer et al., 2015, p. fig.~5)
crude idea 1
merely linking motor representations to perceived phonetic contrasts is sufficient for matching
motivation: Krieger-Redwood, Gaskell, Lindsay, & Jefferies (2013)
---
objection
Some adults never acquire phonological awareness
(Morais et al., 1979)
But motor representations of articulatory gestures can influence perception of phonetic contrasts ... even in pre-literate people
(D’Ausilio et al., 2009; Smalle, Rogers, & Möttönen, 2015; Carneiro Pereira, Patri, & Vannuscorps, 2026)
crude idea 2
linking letters to phones is what enables matching
Castiglioni-Spalten & Ehri (2003, p. fig.~1)
so far:
phone-structured motor representations not sufficient but can facilitate performance in phonological tasks
alphabetic literacy not necessary, but does predict ability
In the case of speech, what do motor representations make accessible?
sounds ≠ phonetic features (nor articulatory gestures)
How do researchers themselves describe
phonological awareness?
‘Phonological awareness refers to one’s degree of sensitivity to the sound structure of oral language.’
‘phonemes do not have physical reality independent of each other. That is, phonemes produced in speech are acoustically inseparable because adjacent phonemes are coarticulated.’
(Anthony & Francis, 2005)
(Anthony & Francis, 2005)
‘the segmentation of the acoustic signal does not correspond directly or in any easily determined way to the segmentation at the phonemic level ...
There is ... no acoustic criterion by which one can segment the sound into its constituent phonemes.’
(I. Y. Liberman et al., 1974, pp. 203–4)
so far:
motor representations not necesary but can facilitate performance in phonological tasks
alphabetic literacy not necessary but does predict phonological awareness
‘basic action concepts are demonstrative concepts.
To have the concept of a basic action is to have a concept of acting ‘thus’,
where ‘thus’ denotes a property made accessible to the agent by the motor representations he is able to form.’
(Pacherie, 2000, p. 425)
inspiration : tones and keypresses
learn keypress-tone association ;
later: hearing tone influences which key is pressed
(Elsner & Hommel, 2001, p. 230)
clue: literacy and motor performance are correlated:
better reading is linked to less coarticulation
(Popescu & Noiray, 2022; Cychosz, Munson, & Edwards, 2021; Cychosz, Munson, Newman, & Edwards, 2021)
rough proposal
Phone-related motor representations influence experience in such a way as to provide markers that reliably discriminate the outcomes of those motor representations.
Misfire Objection
‘unclear what it would be for such a demonstrative to misfire’
Mylopoulos & Pacherie (2016, p. §4)
Selection Objection
CONCLUSION
Some Interface Problems are genuine problems;
we do not yet know how to solve them all—
but expeirence and demonstrative action concepts
are likely to matter.