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Questions for Discussion

video is blue man group feast eating vomit
 

Kagan on

Moral Knowledge

‘When I have an intuition it seems to me that something is the case, and so I am defeasibly justified in believing that things are as they appear to me to be. That fact [...] opens the door to the possibility of moral knowledge.’

(Kagan, 2023, p. 167)

I admire Kagan because he’s so clear. He’s been going at this for at least a couple of decades. Although I don’t do ethics, I understand that he’s a significant ethicist.
Ok, so it’s about intuitions. But which intuitions?
Kagan mentions all kinds of intutions, and on his view there are intutions about relatively abstract matters as well as about particular cases.
Kagan’s focus is mostly on case-specific intutions. So let’s consider a case.
[Can’t say this yet, but since Kagan compares intuitions to observations, it’s natural to focus on case-specific intuitions]

‘Edward is the driver of a trolley, whose brakes have just failed. [...] Edward can turn the trolley, killing the one; or he can refrain from turning the trolley, killing the five’ (Thomson, 1976, p. 206).

May Edward turn the trolley?

One interesting feature of this case is that many people can answer the question with some confidence.
This case is contrasted with another one ...

‘David can take the healthy specimen's parts, killing him, and install them in his [five] patients, saving them. Or he can refrain from taking the healthy specimen's parts, letting his [five] patients die’ (Thomson, 1976, p. 206).

May David kill the healthy person?

‘not even a prima facie case can be made for the claim that Thomson’s presentation of the trolley case appeals to intuitions, where these are construed as judgments with any of features F1--F3.’
(Cappelen, 2012, p. 161)

When thinking about particular cases we can simply see—immediately, and typically without further ado—whether, say, a given act would be right or wrong’
(Kagan, 2001, p. 4)

Why may Edward but not David?

That is one way to use claims about specific scenarios. But that is not our focus.
What’s interesting to us is how, if at all, we know the answer to the question about a single scenario.
Our concern is whether we know Edward may turn the trolley; and, if so, how we know that.
It looks like intuition might be involved here ...
But there are philosophers who deny this (Cappelen).
If you look closely, however, there does not appear to be a substantial debate.
Cappelen has quite strong requirements on something being an intuition.
F1: special phenomenology—Thomson does not appeal to any special phenomenology
F2: Thomson does not regard intuitions as closing discussion on whether Edward may. F2: justify but do not need justification so are a point where justification gives out (‘rock’)
F3: Intuition that p provides a justification for p that is based solely on the subject of intuition’s conceptual competence.
So we have to ask what Kagan has in mind by intuition.
As far as I remember, Kagan does not say what an intuition is.
Kagan (2023, p. 164) writes ‘I can easily imagine someone wanting a fuller account of what exactly an intuition is. I find that a difficult thing to provide.’ Kagan goes on to hint that an intuition is an ‘appearance’ that is ‘produced, or at least apparently produced, by reason’.
So we have to work out what Kagan has in mind by what he says about intuitions.
One thing is clear: he thinks that intuitions allow us to know whether Edward may.
Ok, so we have a sense that Kagan is interested in case-specific intutions, that is claims which you accept independently of having any inferential justification for them.
Next question: How do intuitions enable ethical knowledge?

How do intuitions enable ethical knowledge?

You might have a model on which you’re supposed to just know the claims that are your intutions, where you know them in virtue of these claims being intutions.
But that‘s not quite Kagan’s view. Here’s what he used to think ...

previously

‘it won't suffice if all we can do is organize these intuitions into systematic patterns.

Instead, [...] we need [...] a moral theory that goes below the surface and [explains] the moral phenomena that are the subject matter of our moral intuitions.’

(Kagan, 2001, p. 10)

now

‘moral intuitions function as inputs into our moral theories in something very much like the way that observations function as inputs into our empirical theories’

(Kagan, 2023, p. 159)

The reason I think these are different (but maybe Kagan does not): empirical theories are not about the phenomena of intuitions; they can be used to make systematic sense of the phenomena of intutions but this is not a primary concern, nor a requirement of a successful physical theory.
What Kagan now has in mind does seem quite different from explaining the phenomena that are the subject matter of intutions ...

1. ‘If I have the intuition that P, then [...] my belief that P [...] will be justified [until such time (a time which may never come) as] I find reason to reject it.’

(Kagan, 2023, p. 166)

2. ‘what it is to confirm an intuition:

checking it against other intuitions to see if they harmonize in the appropriate ways.’

(Kagan, 2023, p. 172)

Aside: compare Rawls’ on reflective equilibrium

How are ethical intuitions like observations?

‘observation and intuition involve appearances; they are ways that things can seem to me to be the case.

in both cases

[the] fact that things appear to be one way rather than another [...]

provides the tentative justification for [...] believing that things are indeed as they appear to be.’

(Kagan, 2023, p. 164)

The sceptic needs to show there is ‘something especially problematic about moral intuitions, as distinct from others.’

(Kagan, 2023, p. 170)

an obvious thought

‘Convergence Claim, or CC:

If everyone knew all of the relevant non-normative facts, used the same normative concepts, understood and carefully reflected on the relevant arguments, and was not affected by any distorting influence, we and others would have similar normative beliefs.’

(Parfit, 2013, p. 546)

‘CC is an empirical claim’ (p. 547)

‘Is it [...] true that even if we were perfectly rational and were reflecting on moral questions under ideal conditions we would, nonetheless, continue to have moral disagreements?

[...] Certainly we don’t have any particularly compelling evidence on the question’

(Kagan, 2023, p. 127)

Graham, Haidt, & Nosek (2009, p. figure 3)

So why think that ethical intuitions are too unreliable to be a source of knowledge? One possible reason is cultural variation.

cultural variation, illustrated by purity

* gay marriage

* euthanasia

* abortion

* pornography

* stem cell research

* environmental attitudes

(Koleva, Graham, Iyer, Ditto, & Haidt, 2012; Graham et al., 2019)

Good evidence for cultural variation since liberals tend to barely recognize purity as an ethical issue at all, whereas people who are socially conservative do well on this.
This is based on comparing means: it’s what you need (scalar) measurement invariance for!
BTW university research—it’s not an anecdote from Herodotus, it’s based on an actual discovery.
The difference in ethical intutions about purity matters. It predicts attitudes about ‘gay marriage, euthanasia, abortion, and pornography [...], stem cell research, environmental attitudes, [...] social distancing in real-world social networks’ and more (Koleva et al., 2012; Graham et al., 2019).

r1

‘Why shouldn’t we simply take this to be good reason to reject the particular contested intuitions in question? Instead of dismissing all moral intuitions altogether, why not simply disregard (or, conceivably, give less weight to) those intuitions where there is substantial disagreement, and focus instead on intuitions that are indeed widely shared?’

(Kagan, 2023, p. 176)

But aren’t at least some intuitions universal?

‘one finds nearly complete agreement among moral intuitions [...] such as:

It is right to protect one’s children from lethal danger.’

(Bengson et al., 2020, p. 19)

I mentioned this one earlier.

No: maternal infanticide (Hrdy, 1979)

‘a mother in a hunter-gatherer society examines her baby right after birth and [...] makes a conscious decision to either keep the baby or let it die.’ (Hrdy, 2011, p. 198)

‘unlike any other ape, a mother in a hunter-gatherer society examines her baby right after birth and, depending on its specific attributes and her own social circumstances (especially how much social support she is likely to have), makes a conscious decision to either keep the baby or let it die.’ (Hrdy, 2011, p. 198)
Think about this for a moment. Some people—probably most of us here—have strong intuitions that killing an infant would be morally wrong.
But others have the intuition that, in some cases it would be morally wrong not to kill an infant. (∞todo find the source where it says immoral to keep.)
The dark side of cooperative breeding.
So there is not anything like complete agreement.

r2

‘It doesn’t seem implausible to suggest that some of our sexual mores (and the intuitions and emotions that support them) may be the result of our origins as primates rather than, say, bees.
[...]
If anything like this is right, then these are the sorts of intuitions that we might do well to worry about.’

(Kagan, 2023, pp. 223–4)

r3

‘once we dig below the surface, countless moral disputes do indeed depend, at least in part, on nonmoral issues, and so are really derivative disagreements after all.

[...]

I suspect—though I cannot prove—that the vast majority of our moral disagreements are indeed about derivative moral claims.’

(Kagan, 2023, p. 121)

‘Intuitionism would be challenged if it were true that, even in ideal conditions, there would be many deep disagreements between people who clearly do have moral beliefs, sentiments, or intuitions. [...] they they must defend the claim that, in ideal conditions, there would not be deep and widespread moral disagreements.’

(Parfit, 2013, p. 548)

How are ethical intuitions like observations?

‘observation and intuition involve appearances; they are ways that things can seem to me to be the case.

in both cases

[the] fact that things appear to be one way rather than another [...]

provides the tentative justification for [...] believing that things are indeed as they appear to be.’

(Kagan, 2023, p. 164)

The sceptic needs to show there is ‘something especially problematic about moral intuitions, as distinct from others.’

(Kagan, 2023, p. 170)

another thought

What kind of grounds might we have to be sceptical of observations concerning physical phenomena?
Descartes is usually treated as interested in replying to skepticisms in our first year course, but I don’t believe his main contributions had anythning to do with that ... (apologies for reaheating etc)
This means that physical intuitons are a source of knowledge in a limited range of cases only. First point: we don’t base our understanding of the physical on common-sense.

‘In putting forward an account of light, the first point I want to draw to your attention is that it is possible for there to be a difference between the sensation that we have of it, that is, the idea that we form of it in our imagination through the intermediary of our eyes, and what it is in the objects that produces the sensation in us, that is, what it is in the flame or in the Sun that we term ‘light’’

(Descartes, 1998, p. 81 (AT XI:3))

Descartes, The World (AT 3)

Note that this is Descartes’ starting point (in an early work that was never published because of fear of religious repression.)
Further illustration (not from The World). Descartes’ explanation of why the rainbow is a bow. Relevant because of the gap between sensory perception and the things which cause it. And shows Descartes examines sensory perceptions.

physical intuitions
are a source of knowledge
but only within limits

McCloskey, Caramazza, & Green (1980, p. figure 2B)

McCloskey et al. (1980, p. figure 2D)

Kozhevnikov & Hegarty (2001, figure 1)

‘Two metal balls are the same size, but one weighs twice as much as the other. Both are thrown straight up with the same initial velocity. The time it takes the balls to reach a certain height H will be:’
Fix shape and size. Also fix initial velocity. How would increasing the object’s mass affect how quickly it decelerates when launched vertically? Impetus: larger mass entails greater deceleration (so slower ascent). Newtonian: larger mass entails lower deceleration (so faster ascent) if considering air resistance; otherwise size makes no difference.

simplified from Kozhevnikov & Hegarty (2001)

simplified from Kozhevnikov & Hegarty (2001)

But even more convincingly, the prediction generated by Kozhevnikov and Heggarty’s conjecture about the computational description of the system underpinning representational momentum has been directly confirmed.
So while not decisive, I take this to be strong evidence for a \textbf{vertical distinction} between two systems for physical cognition.
Why do physical intuitons have these limits? They are largely a product of evolution, and evolution focusses on getting things right in situations that were frequent and significant in human experience.
It makes sense that physics would be limited in this way.

reliable

unreliable

physical intuitions

straight tubes

horizontal motion

curved tubes

vertical motion

culturalrevolution 12,000 generations hunter-gatherer lifestyle 240 generations cities exist <2% live in cities 232 generations 8 generations

reliable

unreliable

physical intuitions

straight tubes

horizontal motion

curved tubes

vertical motion

ethical intuitions

food sharing in small bands

cooperative breeding

trolley problems

climate change

‘ultimately we would like to identify the mechanisms which can lead to mistaken intuitions, since that might sometimes help us to confirm which intuitions are erroneous.’

(Kagan, 2023, p. 175)

Bit hard to take because actually there’s a good amount of research on This already and we can see roughly what the limits of intuition are likely to be from it.
Key points include relations between purity and disgust, and a distinction between faster and slower processes.

‘there must be some evolutionary advantage in having a faculty that [...] gets at least some basic moral truths right.’

(Kagan, 2023, p. 184)

cooperative breeding (Hrdy, 2011)

food sharing (Kaplan & Gurven, 2005)

small-scale cooperation

Here I’m thinking about not free-riding when unobserved (Not sure where I have a source from this; could be about religion?)

managing shamans and other leaders (Boehm et al., 1993)

Boehm et al. (1993) is a reference to reverse hierarchial dominance: you have fine-grained control over hierarchy.
To return to the start ...

‘When I have an intuition it seems to me that something is the case, and so I am defeasibly justified in believing that things are as they appear to me to be. That fact [...] opens the door to the possibility of moral knowledge.’

(Kagan, 2023, p. 167)

But only within limits.

What does Kagan claim about the role of intuition in gaining moral knowledge? Is it so?

What is the relation between Kagan’s position and Rawls’ notion of reflective equilibrium?

Is Kagan right about the parallel between physical and moral intuitions?

Given Kagan’s position, what are the limits of moral knowledge?

appendix

Are case-specific intuitions a source of ethical knowledge?

for

successful cognitive practice

(Bengson et al., 2020)

analogy with observation in physics

(Kagan, 2023)

anti

extraneous effects on intuition

(Rini, 2013; Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008)

cultural varation

(McGrath, 2008)

speed—accuracy trade-offs

(Greene, 2014)

bad control

(Cecchini, 2024)