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Conclusion

conclusion

In conclusion, as philosophers (well, you know, sort of in my case), what can we learn from development about the nature of minds and actions?
We started with Leibniz’ view. I think he is wrong because object indexes + metacognitive feelings do not amount to notions and doctines. There is a huge step from object indexes + metacognitive feelings to knowledge proper.

‘the soul inherently contains the sources of various notions and doctrines which external objects merely rouse up on suitable occasions’

Leibniz (1996, p. 48)

(Leibniz, 1996, p. \ 48)
The view is subtler than it seems: we'll return to the subtelties later. [*Actually that isn't in these lectures, but it should be.]
And Locke is wrong insofar as it’s plausible that the operations of object indexes are not a consequence of learning about objects and so plausibly innate. What’s innate may well be essential to gaining knowledge at all, even if it is much less than a source of ‘notions and doctrinces’ as Leibniz suggests.

‘Men, barely by the Use of their natural Faculties, may attain to all the Knowledge they have, without the help of any innate Impressions’

Locke 1975 [1689], p. 48

(Locke, n.d., p. \ 48)
In short, two things: Aside from their effects on behavoiur and attention,

Only metacognitive feelings

connect object indexes

to the epistemic.

And,

Development is rediscovery.